Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Karen Hillier v. William J. Lamborn : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary B. Ferguson, Michael K. Morhman; Attorneys for Appellant.
Stephen G. Morgan; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Certiorari, Hillier v. Lamborn, No. 870370.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1733

This Response to Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

D* •
Kt

.

45.S
.S9
DOCKET NO. T ? 0 ^ " ^

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN HILLIER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Certiorari Docket No. 870370

vs.
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Appellant Lamborn's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari of the Opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals rendered on August 5, 1987, Rehearing
denied on August 25, 1987.

GARY B. FERGUSON
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Lamborn

STEPHEN G. MORGAN
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent Hillier

NOV 9 19.87
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN HILLIER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Certiorari Docket No. 870370

vs.
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Appellant Lamborn's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari of the Opinion of the Utah Court
of Appeals rendered on August 5, 1987, Rehearing
denied on August 25, 1987.

GARY B. FERGUSON
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Lamborn

STEPHEN G. MORGAN
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent Hillier

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

IV

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . .

1

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1

..

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT ui< KA' I, ,

3

ARGUMENT ,
I.

, .

......

7

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING IT TO ALLOW EVIDENCE
CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO WEAR A SEAT BELT
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT AS
REQUIRED BY RULE 43(2) AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN BUT
SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE

43(4)
II.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL DUE TO JUROR USE OF A DICTIONARY
RELATIVE TO THE WORD "PROXIMATE" DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE
43(2) AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF
STATE LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED BY
THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(4)

CONCLUSION

16
19

-111-

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
Pag
A.

CASES

Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984)

7,8

Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984)

15

Clark v. Cassetty, 71 N.M. 89, 376 P.2d 37 (1962)
Clarkson v. Wright, 108 111.2d 129, 90 111.Dec. 950, 483
N.e.2d 268 (1985)
Hillier v. Lamborn, 63 Utah Adv. Rep 17 (Ct. App. 8/5/87) 740
P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987)

8
12,13
1

Leger Construction Co. Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212
(Utah 1977)

15

Nash v. Kamrath, 521 P.2d 161 (Ariz 1974)

16

Protective Casualty Insurance Co. v. Killane, 459 So.2d
1037 (Fla 1984)

14

Pulkrabek v. Lampe, 293 P.2d 998 (Kan 1956)
Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 (1985)
B.

17,18
8,12

STATUTES AND COURT RULES

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-181 (1952 and 1986 Supp.)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186

11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37

7

Utah Rules of Supreme Court, Rule 43(2)

1,7,9

Utah Rules of Supreme Court, Rule 43(4)

1,7,9
16

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 46

15

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61

18

C.
31 ALR 4th 623, 627 (1984)
54 ALR 2d 738

OTHER AUTHORITIES
17,18
17

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the decision of the Court of Appeals, (a) that

the trial court did not err in refusing to allow evidence concerning plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt and (b) that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a
new trial due to juror use of a dictionary relative to the word
"proximate" conflict with a decision of this Court,as required by
Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in order to
grant a writ of certiorari.
2.

Did the Court of Appeals, (a) in excluding evidence

of plaintiffs failue to wear a seat belt and (b) in ruling on
juror use of a dictionary relative to the word "proximate" decide
an important question of state law which has not been but should
be settled by this Court, as required by Rule 43(4) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in order to grant a Writ of
Certiorari .
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In Hillier v. Lamborn, 63 Utah Adv. Rep 17 (Ct.
App. 8/5/87) 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987), a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit A, the Court of Appeals unaminously held that
the trial court did not err 1) in refusing to allow evidence concerning plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt; 2) in failing to
grant a new trial due to a juror's use of a dictionary relative
to the word "proximate".

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The defendant's brief in this regard is correct with
the following exceptions: a) the Order denying defendant's
Petition for Rehearing was dated August 25, 1987, not August 26,
1987 and the Petition for Rehearing was filed by defendant on
October 12, 1987, (although apparently docketed on October 9,
1987) and was hand delivered to plaintiff's counsel on October
13, 1987.

Based thereon, it may be questionable as to whether

defendant has properly complied with the jurisdiction
requirements.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Karen Hillier brought this negligence action
against defendant William J. Lamborn to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision, on or about
11/13/82, near Centerville, Davis County, Utah.

The action was

tried in the district court to a jury, Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby presiding, on March 2, 5 and 7, 1984. On 3/7/84, the
jury returned its special verdict finding defendant 80% and
plaintiff 2056 negligent in proximately causing the collision.
115-117.

R.

The jury further determined the total dollar amount of

general and special damages sustained by plaintiff as a direct
result of the accident was $272,943.38.

Ld.

After adjustments

not relevant to defendant's appeal and reduction for plaintiff's
comparative fault, judgment was finally entered against
defendant, on or about 3/27/84, in the total amount of
$221,209.41

R. 327-330.

On 4/17/84, defendant filed his motion

for new trial, or alternatively, for remittitur.

R. 367-401.

The grounds upon which the motion was based, were virtually

identical to those raised in his brief on appeal.

On 4/17/84,

following a hearing, the district court denied defendant's motion
on each of the grounds asserted.

(Exhibit D.)

defendant filed his notice of appeal.

On 5/15/84,

This Court, however,

subsequently dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds,
although it was later reinstated upon rehearing.
This case was assigned to the Court of appeals which
rendered its opinion on 8/5/87, affirming the decision of the
trial court and the jury verdict.

On 8/25/87, the Court of

Appeals denied defendant's Petition for Rehearing. (Exhibit B)
Thereafter, on 10/9/87, the Court of Appeals issued a Remittitur,
(Exhibit C) and on 10/12/87, defendant filed his Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts supported by the record, and undisputed which
are relevant to the issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

On 11/13/82, at about 8:30 a.m., plaintiff was

driving her 1978 Chevrolet south on the frontage road east of
1-15 between Farmington and Centerville, at about 45 m.p.h. in a
50 m.p.h. zone (Tr.172-177), when defendnat, who was road hunting
for pheasants (Tr.192-193, 208, 377), while driving his 1974 Ford
pickup truck south at about 10-12 m.p.h. on the same road
entirely on the shoulder of the road completely to the right of
the fog line painted on the asphalt (Tr.175-176) , when suddenly
and without warning or signal, defendant steered his truck into
plaintiff's lane directly in front of her, when she was within
4-5 car lengths of passing him (Tr.175-178), which according to

plaintiff's expert witnesses, Frank Grant and David Stephens, did
not give plaintiff time to take evasive action to avoid a
collision.

(Tr.247-248, 301-302)

If defendant did not pull in

front of plaintiff, she had plenty of room to pass in her own
lane without any need to steer her car to the left into the
northbound lane of traffic.
2.

(Tr.175-176, 185-186)

As a result of the impact, plaintiff's car spun

around and then rolled over, coming to rest upside down.
(Tr.204-205, 351-352)
the highway.

Plaintiff was thrown from the vehicle onto

As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered

serious and permanent injuries and damages.
68-72, 83-89, 133-171, 408-420)

(Tr.33-^2, 51-52,

In ruling on defendant's motion

for a new trial or in the alternative a remittitur, the court
stated that
"the jury certainly found damages that were within
reason of the testimony that was given. .They could
well have found more than they did and still been within reason. So there is no grounds for the court to
grant a remittitur on that." (Exhibit D) .
Even defendant's counsel admitted in opening statement that plaintiff had been "badly injured in the automobile accident," "no
doubt about it." (Tr.24)
3.

Defendant did not affirmatively plead the seat belt

defense in his answer to plaintiff's complaint.
4.

Defendant did not raise the seat belt defense as an

issue at the pretrial hearing or in the Pretrial Order.

Nothing

is mentioned about seat belts or mitigation of damages under
"Defendant's Claims," "Contested Issues of Fact" or "Contested
Issues of Law."

A copy of the Judge's notes at the pretrial

hearing and the Pretrial Order are attached as Exhibits E and F
respectively.
5.

Defendant raised the seat belt issue for the first

time on the second day of trial.
6.

Defendant, not plaintiff, first broached the seat

belt issue at trial.

In defendant's cross-examination of Dr.

Robert Jordan, an orthopedic surgeon who treated plaintiff at the
emergency room, his counsel qualified the witness as an expert in
trauma medicine and asked him, over plaintiff's objection,
several questions several questions relating to his opinion
whether plaintiff sustained her orthopedic injuries inside her
car or outside of it during the rollover.

(Tr.74-78)

The

obvious intent of that line of questioning, of course, was to
sensitize the jury to the fact plaintiff was not wearing her seat
belt and to force them to consider that some of plaintiff's
injuries would not have been sustained but for her failure in
that regard.
7.

During plaintiff's testimony, her counsel asked her

whether her car was equipped with a seat belt and if so, whether
she was wearing it at the time of the collision.

(Tr.175) Defen-

dant 's counsel did not object to these questions on any basis,
including any alleged violation of the pretrial order.

There is

no order in the record, pretrial or otherwise, which prohibits
plaintiff from testifying that she was not wearing her seat belt.
Later, after the parties had argued their respective positions to
the Court on the seat belt defense, and following the court's
ruling, defendant's counsel for the first time urged the court to

reconsider its ruling on the basis plaintiff had opened the door
to seat belt evidence in her testimony.

Specifically, the record

discloses:
MR. MOHRMAN: Your honor, if it may please the Court, I
forgot to mention one issue that I think I need to get
on the record, if you donyt mind.
THE COURT:

Yes.

Go ahead.

MR. MORHMAN: It's also our position that the plaintiff's attorney raised the issue of seat belts in their
questioning in their case in chief and, therefore, they
are precluded from arguing against us with regard to
proper proof on that issue. (Tr.281-282)
8.

There is no jury instruction in the record proposed

by defendant on the seat belt issue, other than one which simply
raises the issue as one of defendant's claims.

Tr.173.

Defend-

ant's counsel did request "a jury instruction" on the seat belt
defense orally one time before the jury retired.

Tr.280.

No

written instruction, however, was submitted.
9.

After the jurors retired, one of their number appar-

ently requested the bailiff to supply them with a dictionary.
The only evidence in the record which details

what the bailiff

did in response to the request, and what the jurors did as a
result, is set forth in the affidavits

of two jurors, to wit,

the foreperson of the jury, Kathy 0. Davis, who stated that the
"extraneous information received provided no new information to
the jury," and Frank Arnold, who was the only juror who disagreed
with the jury's determination on the issue of comparative
and its award of general damages.

(Tr.614-615)

fault

The record does

not contain the actual definition of "proximate" the jury read
nor does it identify the dictionary used.

10.

In any event, the district court's first instruc-

tion to the jury admonished jurors as follows:
"it is your duty . . . to follow the law as the Court
states it to you, regardless of what you personally
believe the law is or ought to be." . . . n[t]he
authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power,
but must be exercised . . . in accordance with rules
of law stated to you." (Tr.235)
There is no evidence any juror violated his or her oath to do
just

that.

In the courts eleventh instruction (Exhibit G) the

jury was advised as to proximate cause as follows:
"The proximate case of an injury is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. It
is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily sets
in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING IT TO ALLOW EVIDENCE CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO WEAR A SEAT BELT DOES
NOT CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT AS REQUIRED
BY RULE 43(2) AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPORTANT
QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE
SETTLED BY THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(4).
Defendant's argument that the Court of Appeals decision
is in conflict with Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728
(Utah 1984) or with § 78-27-37 (1953 as amended) is
without merit.

Acculog was not a seat belt case.

In Acculog,

the Supreme Court held that
"where it was found that van had been negligently
serviced and that such negligence was proximate cause
of fire and damage sustained, plaintiffs' failure to
carry fire extinguisher in van was not contributing
factor in causing injury, and trial court erred in submitting to jury question of plaintiffs' comparative
negligence.f!
Id. at 728.

(Emphasis added.)

The majority opinion analyzed the law in this area as follows:
"A plaintiff cannot be held to be contributorily negligent unless his negligence is causally connected to the
plaintiff?s injury."
* * *

In other words, where plaintiff's negligent conduct was
a contributing factor in causing the injury, comparative negligence becomes a defense for the defendant."
* * *

"We are not concerned in comparative negligence law with the
cause of the damage, but with the cause of the injury
instead.
The "injury" is sometimes used in the sense
of "damage," as including the harm orloss of
which compensation is sought, and has been
defined as damage resulting from an unlawful
act; but in strict legal significance, there
is, properly speaking, a material distinction
between the two terms in that injury means
something done against the right of the
party, producing damage, whereas damage is
the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by
reason of the injury. Clark v.
Cassetty, 71 N.M. 89, 376 P.2d 37 (1962).
Id. at 730. (Emphasis added.)
(New Mexico rejected the so called seat belt defense in
Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 (1985).)
Given the manner in which the court applied the foregoing rule to
the facts in Acculog, supra, it stands to reason that unless
a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt in a case like the
present one proximately causes injury (the accident which produced her damages), all evidence with respect thereto should be
excluded from the liability determination.

In the case at bar,

plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt did not contribute in
causing the injury, i.e., the accident.
It should be noted that the majority opinion was
written by Justice Howe with Justices Hall and Durham concurring

in the majority opinion and Justice Stewart concurring in the
result.

Justice Oaks, the only one of the five Justices no

longer on the bench, wrote a separate concurring opinion, not
concurred in by the other Justices and thus Justice Oaks
concurring opinion is simply dicta and not the law of the state
of Utah.
In the majority opinion, the court stated as follows:
"The trial court expressed the opinion that there might
be a question of mitigation of damages, but that issue
is not before us and we decline to address it." Id. at
731• (Emphasis added.)
Since the Supreme Court did not even address the mitigation of
damages issue or seat belt defense in the majority opinion in
Acculog, supra, there is no way that the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the subject case to affirming the trial
court's decision to exclude evidence of plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt (a mitigation of damages sort of defense) could
be in conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court as
required by Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
In the subject case, the Court of Appeals held:
"The majority of other jurisdictions have held that
evidence of nonuse of seat belt on the issue of mitigation of damages is inadmissable. (cases omitted) We
agree with the rationale of those cases and hold
similarly that seat belt evidence is inadmissable in
this case which arose prior to the inactment of the
present Utah Statute." (Exhibit A)
By judicial decision, at least 20 states, have rejected
the so-called seat belt defense, including virtualy all the
Intermountain states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Washington and Oregon.)

Additionally there are

many states which have abolished the seat belt defense by statute.
Only three states have adopted it.
Wisconsin).

(Florida, New York and

The sheer magnitude of the majority is overwhelming.

See pages 53-55 of plaintiff's original brief for the case
citations and an in depth analysis of the cases which discloses
that the cases cited by defendant on pages 10 and 11 of his brief
do not stand for the proposition advanced either because 1) they
have little or nothing to do with the seat belt defense 2) they
are federal cases attempting to predict state law which subsequently proved inaccurate 3) they are appellate cases subsequently overruled by a higher court or 4) the statements in the cases
with respect to the seat belt defense are dicta.
The reasons most often found in the cases rejecting the
seat belt defense are as follows:
1.

As to why they refuse to allow it on issue of

comparative negligence, the court's reason: (a) Plaintiff has no
statutory or common law duty to wear a seat belt; (b) the failure
to wear a seat belt is rarely a proximate cause of a accident;
(c) seat belts are not widely used by the public (75% of
motorists don't wear them); (d) it is for the legislature to
decide, not the courts.
2.

As to why they refuse to allow it on the issue of

mitigation of damages, the court's reason (a) the duty to mitigate arises after plaintiff has been injured, not before; (b)
plaintjrff has no duty to anticipate defendant's negligence; (c)
defendant would be allowed a windfall by dodging a substantial
portion of his liability; and (d) trial complication and jury

confusion—battle of experts, crash helmets, armoured cars, air
bags, etc.
At the time of this accident, 11/13/82, Utah had no
statute mandating the wearing of seat belts for drivers of motor
vehicles.

Since this accdent, and during the pendancy of this

appeal, the Utah Legislature enacted in 1986 the "Motor Vehicle
Seat Belt Usage Act," Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-181 et seq.
(1952 and 1986 Supp.).

Section 41-6-186 of that act

states as follows:
The failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute
contributory or comparative negligence, and may not be
introduced as evidence in any civil litigation on the
issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of
damages.
Thus, since the Utah legislature has already settled
this question on matters arising after the effective date of the
statute, there does not exist "an important question of state law
which has not been but should be settled by this court" as required by Rule 43(4) of the Rule of the Utah Supreme Court.
This recent legislation is significant for the following additional reasons:
(1)

It clearly demonstrates the legislative policy of

the State of Utah is not to allow the failure to use seat belts
as a factor in determining fault or damages in civil litigation.
It does this even in the face of other provisions of the same
act which make seat belt usage mandatory.

In light of the policy

of Utah's seat belt law, it is difficult to comprehend the logic,
equity or fairness that would allow the failure to use seat belts

as a factor in determining fault or damage prior to the existence
of any such statutory duty;
(2) The prohibition against using evidence of the failure to use seat belts in civil litigation is wholly ocnsistent
with the position taken by plaintiff as to the common law of the
State of Utah at the time this matter went to trial; and
(3)

The prohibition against using evidence of failure

to use seat belts codified by the Utah State Legislature is
strong reason to sustain the decision of the trial court below
which, like the legislature, determined that such evidence was
inadmissable, especially where there was no statutory duty to
wear seat belts at the time of the accident.
In Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476
(1985), the New Mexico Supreme Court held as follows:
. • • We believe that the creation of a "seat belt
defense" is a matter for the legislature, not for the
judiciary.
Thomas, 695 P.2d at 477.
The above holding in Thomas, provides a strong
basis for courts to refrain from judicially creating a "seat belt
defense," especially where in this case it would have no
prospective application now that the Utah Legislature has spoken
on this issue.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently found itself in an
analogous position.

In Clarkson v. Wright, 108 111.2d 129,

90 111.Dec. 950, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985), the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the existence of a "seat belt
defense" where the Illinois Legislature, like the Utah Legisla-

ture, had enacted legislation (while the Clarkson case was
on appeal) making the use of seat belts mandatory but prohibiting
the admission of evidence of failure to use seat belts in civil
litigation.

The Court overruled several Illinois1 appellate

level decisions holding that such evidence was admissable.

It is

significant to note that five of these Illinois Appellate Court
decisions were relied on by defendant in this case at pages 25
and 26 of defendant's original brief.

Prior to addressing the

effect of the Illinois1 seat belt legislation passed during the
pendancy of the Clarkson appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
justified its rejection of the appellate court's decision
stating:
We agree with the majority view that failure to use a
seat belt was not negligence or contributory negligence
which caused the accident out of which plaintiff's
injuries arose. At most, the failure to use a seat
belt created a condition which possibility may have
increased the severity of plaintiff's injuries.
(Emphasis added.)
Clarkson, N.E.2d at 269.
The Illinois court went on to explain that:
Once plaintiff suffered an injruy, there was, of
course, a duty to mitigate the damages in any reasonable way possible. That duty to mitigate damages which
arose subsequent to the injury, is, however, clearly
distinguishable from any duty which existed prior to
the injury here; there was no statutory duty to wear a
seat belt and the presence of the seat belt in the
automobile did not create the duty to wear it any more
than would the presence in the automobile of a
protective helmet create a duty to wear that. We find
no authority which imposed on plaintiff the duty to
anticipate and guard against defendant's negligence.
We conclude that the rule followed in the majority of
jurisdictions which have considered the question
[citations omitted] that evidence of failure to wear a
seat belt should not be admitted with respect to either
the question of liability or damages is a sound one
which should be followed in this jurisdiction.

Clarkson, 483 N.E.2d at 270.

(Emphasis added.)

In concluding its decision, the Clarkson court noted that
its decision was in full accord with the enactment by the
Illinois Legislature of the provision prohibiting the
introduction of failure to use seat belts into evidence in civil
litigation.
It would be gross error to reject the authority of the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in this county, including
virtually all of the Intermountain and western states, by adopting a rule of law, i.e., the seat belt defense, fraught with
unfairness, injustice and significant policy and practical
problems, particularly where, as in this case, the defense (a)
was not pled; (b) was not framed in the pretrial order; (c) was
not embodied in any proposed instruction of defendant; and (d)
otherwise was raised for the first time, according to the record,
on the second day of trial.

Based on the facts in the subject

case, defendant would have been precluded from using the seat
belt defense even in Florida, a jurisdiction that allows the
defense under proper circumstances.

In Protective Casualty

Insurance Co. v. Killane, 459 So.2d 1037 (Fla 1984), where the
defendant (1) did not mention the seat belt defense in his
Answer; (2) did not list it in the Pretrial Order; and (3) did
not mention it until the 1st day of trial, the court held defendand could not present evidence of plaintiff's failure to wear a
seat belt for consideration in assessing paintiff's damages.
In the subject case, defendant argues that plaintiff's
counsel opened the door to such evidence by asking plaintiff if the

her car had seat belts and if she was wearing it at the time of
accident. Defendant's position is without merit for three reasons:
(1) It is a well-recognized rule in this state that, !f[c]urative
admissibility of evidence is a matter withint the discretion of
the trial court, and we will not reverse that decision absent an
abuse of discretion." Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
682 P.2d 832 at 840; see also, Leger Construction Co. Inc.
v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1977).
(2) The record reflects that defendant did not object on the
ground of curative admissibility of the seat belt evidence at or
before the time the district court made its ruling. (Tr.175) His
first objection on that ground, according to the record, was some
time after the court had already ruled. (Tr.281-282)

As a

result, he was precluded from raising the issue on appeal by the
clear mandate of Rule 46, U.R.Civ.P. which provides
ff

[i]t is sufficient that a party, at the time the
ruling or oder of the court is made or sought, makes
known to the court the action which he desires the
court to take or his objection to the action of the
court, and his grounds therefor". . . (The) burden is
always on the party objecting to make certain that the
record adequately preserves an objection or argument
for review in the event of an appeal." (Emphasis added)
(3)

Defendant cites no cases in which this Court reversed the

district court's determination on curative evidence under
circumstances similar to those of the present case.

His failure

to do so suggests the deference this Court gives to the district
court on the issue of curative admissibility.

In this case, even

assuming arguendo that plaintiff is responsbile for opening the
door on the issue, which plaintiff denies, the district court's
refusal to grant defendant a new trial on this point was not an
abuse of discretion for several reasons.

Plaintiff only opened

the door to the very limited issue of whether she was wearing a

seat belt at the time of the accident.

To open the door to that

issue is not the same as opening the door to the issues of the
legal effect of her failure to wear her seat belt or the causal
connection between such failure and some or all of the injuries
she sustained.

Moreover, even a perfuntory review of the record

on the issue clearly indicates plaintiff's counsel only asked the
questions in response to defendant's inference on cross examination of Dr. Jordan that she was not wearing a seat belt
(Tr.74-78), to show plaintiff had nothing to hide and for the
purpose of accurately describing the accident scenario and the
mechanics of the injury for the jury.

In Nash v. Kamrath,

521 P.2d 161 (Ariz 1974), although the court refused to
recognize "that failure to use a seat belt constituted a viable
defense," it did affirm the trial court's admission of whether or
not plaintiff was "using a seat belt" to show "the mechanics of
the injury" and "the circumstances surrounding" the accident.
Id. 521 P.2d at 164.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL DUE TO JUROR USE OF A DICTIONARY RELATIVE
TO THE WORD "PROXIMATE" DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH A
DECISION OF THIS COURT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(2)
AND DOES NOT INVOLVE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW
THAT HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 43(4)
In the subject case, the Court of Appeals held:
In this case, the record does not contain the actual
definition of "proximate" the jury read nor identify
the dictionary used. Without that definition we cannot
compare the legal definition of "proximate cause" with
the definition of "proximate" examined by the jury. In
the absence of that crucial information, we do not find

any basis for finding that substantial rights of defendant where prejudiced by the juror's reference to the
dictionary." (Exhibit A)
There is no indication in the record the jury was influenced by the dictionary definition of "proximate" in their deliberations or that their verdict would have been any different but
for the definition.

There was no prejudice to the defendant by

reason of the juror's use of the dictionary.

The definition of

words in our standard dictionaries is taken as a matter of common
knowledge which a juror is supposed to possess.
738, superceded by 31 ALR 4th 623 (1984).

54 ALR 2d

Whatever any

individual juror may have understood "proximate" to mean it was
applied equally to plaintiff and defendant.

All jurors agreed

unanimously to Questions 1-4 on the Special Verdict concerning
negligence and proximate cause.
It should be noted, however, that the critical issue in
the subject case was negligence and not proximate cause.

There

is no record that defendant ever argued proximate cause to the
jury.

The final arguments were recorded but not transcribed (at

the request of defendant's counsel) even though the Designation
of Record filed by defendant's counsel ordered the entire transcript to the trial.
In Pulkrabek v. Lampe, 293 P.2d 998 (Kan 1956)
where the instruction on proximate case is extemely similar to
the one given in this case, the court held as follows:
Upon careful analysis of the heretofore quoted dictionary definition of the word "proximate" and the trial
court's instruction regarding "proximate cause" we find
nothing in the term "proximate," as defined, which can

be regarded as inconsistent with the concept of "proximate cause" as set forthin the instructions. It
follows we would not be warranted in holding that in
and of itself the mere fact the jury read such definition is sufficient to make it affirmatively appear the
substantial rights of the appellant were prejudiced by
that action. (Emphasis added.)
The court in Pulkrabek rejected plaintifffs contention the
jury "might have been influenced" by the dictionary definition,
noting that such a showing,
"in our opinion, is not sufficient to comply with the
established rule of this jurisdiction that a judgment
will not be reversed unless it affirmatively appears
the substantial rights of the parties complaining have
been prejudiced thereby."
* * #

From the record presented it appears that the trial
court, which we pause to note was in much better
position to pass on the situation than this court, was
convinced that the misconduct of the jury was not such
that prejudice therefrom resulted against the
appellant. ~. '. [T]his court has always held that an
order allowing or denying a motion for a new trial will
not be reversed unless abuse of discretion by the trial
court is apparent.
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "harmless error" is not a ground for granting a new
trial unless it affects "the substantial rights of the parties."
The rule concerning use of dictionaries followed by most courts
has been stated in an annotation at 31 ALR 4th 623, 627
(1984) as follows:
"Courts appear willing to dismiss a juryfs consultation
of dictionaries or encyclopedias as harmless error . .
. . " (Emphasis added.)
In the subject case, it was harmless error; it was not
prejudicial; it did not affect the substantial rights of the
parties; and it did not prevent either party from having a fair
trial.

Judge Cornaby, in ruling on defendant's Motion for a
New Trial in the subject case, held as follows concerning the
jurorfs use of the dictionary:
"It was improper, of course, for the bailiff to give
the jury the dictionary, even though—and the court
recognizes that that is juror misconduct. The court
had given a definition of "proximate cause" to the jury,
and my guess is, if they had read it carefully they
would have probably known what "proximate" meant.
I still have to ask myself the question whether there
was a reasonable possibility of prejudice on the part
of the jurors by having that dictionary definition of
"proximate," and since they alredy had the definition
of "proximate cause" by the court, the court does not
believe it falls in that category.
And so, it's not a basis for the court granting a new
trial on that basis." (Emphasis added.) (See Exhibit A.)
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the decision of the
Court of Appeals is correct, and since it is not in conflict with
any decision of this Court and does not involve important questions of state law that should be settled by this court, this
court should deny defendant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
Plaintiff has now waited almost 4 years since the jury awarded her
what they and the court determined to be fair and just compensation for her injuries.

Plaintiff is naturally frustrated with the

appellate process which has taken so long, and now respectfully
requests that this matter be brought to an end by this court denydefendant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari so that justice can
be done and plaintiff can finally receive what she was awarded
almost 4 years ago.
DATED this 9th day of November, 1987.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
AAJLMXU^
\r)
Stephen G. Morgan

Attorney for

CL*^

(j

Plaintiff-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument to be hand delivered on the 9th day
of November, 1987, to Gary B. Ferguson and Michael K. Mohrman,
SCB Tower, Suite 700, 50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84110.
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EXHIBIT "A"

Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300
(Utah App. 1987)
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there is no significant justification for the
state to intervene and speedily terminate
the unwed father's constitutionally protected parental rights. Since Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4(3Xc) does not apply in this situation, we need not reach the due process
question nor invoke the equitable powers
of the court
My colleagues are concerned that this
result leaves no way to extinguish the putative father's parental rights in stepfather
adoptions. I believe their rationale is contrary to the underlying legislative policies
and the plain reading of the statute. I see
nothing wrong with treating the natural
father's rights and interests, in the stepchild adoption context, the same way those
rights and interests have been treated historically. That is, by use of consent or
traditional abandonment procedures. Application of the statute to the facts before
us, requiring the filing of a paternity notice
even though the mother has kept the child,
might not pass constitutional muster.
There could be abuse of the system by an
unwed mother who, as here, would race to
the courthouse with a petition for adoption
signed by any petitioner available, solely to
terminate the parental rights of a man she
wants out of her life and her child's life.

Karen HILLIER, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
William J. LAMBORN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 860030-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 5, 1987.
Automobile driver brought action
against truck driver to recover damages
for personal injury and property damage.

The Davis County District Court, Douglas
L. Cornaby, J., found truck driver 80% negligent and automobile driver 20% negligent.
Truck driver appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) submission of sudden emergency instruction to
jury was in accordance with automobile
driver's theory of case and was supported
by evidence; (2) seat belt evidence was
inadmissible; (3) truck driver was not entitled to new trial; and (4) award of $221,209.41 in damages was not shockingly excessive.
Affirmed.

1. Trial <3=>203(1)
Trial court has duty to cover theories
and points of law of both parties in its
instructions, provided there is competent
evidence to support them.
2. Automobiles <s=>246(37)
Submission of sudden emergency instruction to jury in personal injury and
property damage case was in accordance
with automobile driver's theory of the case
and was supported by evidence, even
though jury ultimately determined that
automobile driver was 20% negligent; automobile driver testified that she saw truck
some distance south of her, entirely on
shoulder of road, moving slowly, automobile driver could not determine what truck
driver was doing but assumed he intended
to slow truck to a stop and park it, when
automobile driver was four or five car
lengths from truck driver, he steered his
truck into automobile driver's lane directly
in front of her and he did not signal before
driving onto road.
3. Automobiles e=»209
Automobile driver was not obviously
negligent for failing to move into left lane
prior to passing truck, which was moving
slowly on shoulder of road; automobile
driver was driving on two-lane road and
should not necessarily have been expected
to cross center line to avoid car driving
slowly on shoulder.
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4. Automobiles e»243(17)
Seat belt evidence was inadmissible in
negligence action which arose prior to enactment of current statute which provides
that failure to wear seat belt does not
constitute contributory or comparative negligence and may not be introduced as evidence in civil litigation on issue of injuries
or on issue of mitigation of damages. U.C.
A.1953, 41-6-186.

Gary B. Ferguson, Michael K. Mohrman,
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Stephen G. Morgan, Mark L. Anderson,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent

5. Appeal and Error ®=1069.1
Although jury's request in negligence
action for a dictionary to look up the word
"proximate" was improper and irregular
and proper procedure would have been for
jury to report difficulty regarding word to
court and for court to instruct jury on
definition, defendant was not entitled to a
new trial; record did not contain actual
definition of "proximate" which jury read
or identify dictionary used and in the absence of that crucial information, there was
no basis to find substantial rights of defendant were prejudiced.

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff commenced this action against
defendant to recover for personal injury
and property damage she suffered as a
result of an automobile accident with defendant. The jury' found defendant 80%
negligent, plaintiff 20% negligent and
awarded plaintiff $221,209.41 in damages.
Defendant appeals seeking a new trial or a
reduction in the damages.

6. Trial <3=>344
Both plaintiffs and defendant's affidavits from jurors regarding a juror's use of
dictionary were admissible under evidentiary rule providing that juror may testify on
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to jury's
attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror, since a question existed as to whether use of dictionary was prejudicial. Rules
of Evid., Rule 606(b).
7. Damages <3=>96, 104
Juries are given wide discretion in assessing damages.
8. Damages <3=>132(1), 137
Jury verdict in favor of automobile
driver in the amount of $221,209.41 in personal injury and property damage action
was supported by competent evidence and
was not shockingly excessive in light of
extensive injuries suffered by automobile
driver in collision with truck.

Before GREENWOOD, BENCH and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION

At about 8:30 a.m. on November 13,
1982, plaintiff was driving southbound on
1-15 near Farmington, Utah when defendant, who was driving south slowly on the
right shoulder of the road, pulled out in
front of her causing her to swerve sharply
and her car to roll over. Plaintiff was
thrown from the vehicle and suffered extensive injuries.
The jury was instructed, over defendant's objection, on the sudden emergency
doctrine which states in part that a person
who, without negligence on his part, is
suddenly confronted with peril is not required to use the same judgment required
in calmer moments. The court, however,
refused to submit defendant's seat belt instruction to the jury and ruled that defendant would not be allowed to present any
evidence regarding seat belts. During jury
deliberations one juror requested and received a dictionary from the bailiff for the
purpose of defining "proximate" in order to
understand "proximate cause." After the
jury returned its verdict a judgment was
entered. This appeal followed the court's
denial of defendant's motion for a new trial
or, alternatively, reduction of damages.
On appeal defendant claims the trial
court erred in: 1) submitting the sudden
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emergency instruction to the jury; 2) disallowing the seat belt instruction and evidence; 3) failing to grant a new trial due to
the juror's use of a dictionary to define
"proximate"; and 4) denying the motion
for a new trial on the basis that the jury
verdict was unreasonable and based on passion, prejudice and insufficient evidence.
I
Defendant first contends that the trial
court erred in instructing the jury on the
sudden emergency doctrine. Defendant argues the sudden emergency instruction
was inappropriate because it requires plaintiff to be free of negligence. The instruction stated:
A person, who without negligence on his
part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril arising from either the
actual presence or the appearance of imminent danger to himself or to others is
not expected nor required to use the
same judgment and prudence that may
be required of him in calmer and more
deliberate moments.
In such a situation, his duty is to exercise
only the degree of care which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
If, at that moment, he exercises such
care, he does all the law requires of him,
even though in the light of after-events,
it might appear that a difference choice
and manner of action would have been
better and safer.
Defendant points out that plaintiff was not
negligence free because the jury found her
20% negligent Defendant also claims that
plaintiff was necessarily negligent because
she failed to move into the left lane when
she first saw defendant's truck on the side
of the road and a non-negligent person
would have changed lanes.
Plaintiffs theory of the case, on the other hand, was that she was not negligent for
failing to anticipate defendant's act of pulling out in front of her. She claimed that
defendant should have used his signal and
looked behind him before pulling out into
the right hand lane. Plaintiff asserts that
the sudden emergency instruction was

proper because it was consistent with her
theory of the case. We agree.
[1] The general rule is that a party is
entitled to have his theory of the case
submitted to the jury. Waiters v. Querry,
626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981). The trial
court has a duty to "cover the theories and
points of law of both parties in its instructions, provided there is competent evidence
to support them." Black v. McKnight, 562
P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has examined
the appropriateness of submitting a sudden
emergency instruction to the jury in several cases. In Redd v. Airway Motor Coach
Lines, Inc., 104 Utah 9, 137 P.2d 374
(1943), Christiansen .v. Utah Transit
AutL, 649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982) and
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah
1983), the Court found no error in the trial
court's submission of a sudden emergency
instruction.
In Redd, the Court found the instruction
proper where the jury was not compelled
by the evidence to conclude that defendant
was driving without due care. Redd, 137
P.2d at 378. Similarly, in Christiansen,
the Court upheld a sudden emergency instruction despite the fact that the jury
found both parties partially negligent. The
Court reasoned that the instruction was
proper because it was supported by some
evidence and by one of the parties' theories. Christensen, 649 P.2d at 47. Finally,
in Anderson, the Court found no error
where the sudden emergency instruction
presented defendant's theory of the case
that he had not acted negligently.
Anderson, 671 P.2d at 174.
[2,3] In this case, plaintiff testified
that she saw defendant's truck some distance south of her, entirely on the shoulder
of the road, moving south slowly. She
could not determine what defendant was
doing but assumed he intended to slow the
truck to a stop and park it. (In fact, defendant was "road hunting" for pheasants.) When she was four or five car
lengths from him, he steered his truck into
plaintiff's lane directly in front of her. It
is undisputed that defendant did not signal

HILLIER v. LAMBORN
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before driving onto the road from the
shoulder. Plaintiffs theory of the case
was that she was not at fault for failing to
anticipate defendant's negligence in pulling
out in front of her. The trial court's submission of the sudden emergency instruction to the jury was in accordance with
plaintiffs theory of the case and was supported by evidence presented at trial. The
jury's ultimate determination that plaintiff
was 20% negligent does not nullify the
propriety of the instruction. Likewise, we
reject defendant's contention that plaintiff
was obviously negligent for failing to move
into the left lane prior to passing defendant. Plaintiff was driving on a two-lane
road and should not necessarily be expected to cross the center line to avoid a car
driving slowly on the shoulder. The question of plaintiffs negligence was a question
of fact for the jury and the trial court could
not conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff was negligent.
Defendant cites two Utah cases which he
contends are indistinguishable from this
case and dictate reversal of the trial court's
denial of the motion for a new trial. In
Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d
474 (1971) and Keller v. Shelley, 551 P.2d
513 (Utah 1976), the Court found as a matter of law that the sudden emergency or
peril did not arise without fault by the
defendants. In Solt, defendant, while driving his automobile, hit a two-year, eight
month old child who followed a ball into the
street. Defendant testified he was driving
30 to 35 miles per hour when he observed
the child come upon the roadway 60 to 80
feet in front of him. Defendant applied his
brakes but was unable to avoid striking the
child. Defendant did not contend that
there was any sudden darting and the
Court found the sudden emergency instruction improper due to the absence of evidence of a sudden or unexpected situation
arising without the fault of defendant.
The Court said the defendant saw what he
should have seen all the time and was
therefore negligent. The Court, in reversing, noted that "[u]nder the evidence given
in this case it is difficult to see how the
jury could have found for the defendant
unless they were misled by some instruc-
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tions given by the Court." Solt, 479 P.2d
at 476.
The case before this Court differs from
Solt in two important respects. First, in
this case, plaintiff contends defendant's act
of pulling out in front of her caused a
sudden and unexpected situation, whereas
in Solt, no such claim was made. Second,
there is substantial difference between a
child chasing a ball into the street and an
adult in an automobile pulling out in front
of another vehicle without signaling. A
young child is reasonably likely to run into
a street in front of a car. Conversely, an
adult would reasonably be expected to first
look behind him and signal before pulling
into the road from the shoulder.
Similarly, Keller involves a situation
where no evidence was submitted to demonstrate a sudden and unexpected situation
arising without fault on the part of the
plaintiff. Keller, 551 P.2d at 514. In Keller, defendant, while passing another vehicle, drove into the rear of plaintiff's vehicle. The Court recognized that a driver
intending to pass another vehicle must be
certain that he can safely pass the other
vehicle. When defendant attempted to
pass, plaintiff was stopped waiting for traffic to clear so she could make a left turn.
The Court found the sudden emergency
instruction improper because defendant
was clearly negligent. Unlike Keller, in
this case plaintiff was not undisputably
negligent. Therefore, in light of plaintiff's
evidence submitted at trial and her theory
of the case, the instruction was proper.
II
[4] Defendant's next claim is that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence concerning plaintiffs failure to wear
a seat belt and by failing to submit an
instruction to the jury that nonuse of a seat
belt may mitigate damages.
A majority of other jurisdictions have
held that evidence of nonuse of a seat belt
on the issue of mitigation of damages is
inadmissible. Britton v. Doehring, 286
Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666, 671 (1970); Nash v.
Kamrath, 21 Ariz.App. 530, 521 P.2d 161,

304 Utah

740 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

use of a dictionary to define "utter" did not
prejudice the substantial rights of defendant and did not warrant reversal. The
Court explained that even if the judge had
instructed the jury on the definition of "utter" it would have been the same in substance as the dictionary definition read by
the jury.
In this case, the record does not contain
the actual definition of "proximate" the
jury read nor identify the dictionary used.
Without that definition we cannot compare
the legal definition of "proximate cause"
with the definition of "proximate" examined by the jury. In the absence of that
crucial information, we do not find any
basis for finding that substantial rights of
defendant were prejudiced by the juror's
Ill
reference to the dictionary.
The third issue raised on appeal is whethPlaintiff, who nonetheless saw fit to proer the trial court erred in failing to grant a vide a counteraffidavit designed to diffuse
new trial due to the juror's 2 use of a the gravity of the juror's use of the dictiodictionary. According to affidavits sub- nary, claims the trial court erred in considmitted to the court, the jury, during delib- ering the affidavit due to the restrictions
erations, asked the bailiff for a dictionary imposed by Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2). Rule
to define "proximate" in order to under- 59(a)(2) states:
stand "proximate cause."3 The bailiff
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
complied.
new trial may be granted .. for any of
the following causes ... (2) Misconduct
[5] Clearly the jury's request for a dicof the jury; and whenever any one or
tionary and consideration of "proximate"
more of the jurors have been induced to
was improper and irregular. State v. Donassent to any general or special verdict,
ald, 90 Utah 533, 537, 63 P.2d 246, 248
(1936). The jury was instructed that "it is
or to a finding on any question submitted
your duty to follow the law as the court
to them by the court, by resort to a
states it to you." The proper procedure
determination by chance or as a result of
would have been for the jury to report the
bribery, such misconduct may be proved
difficulty to the court and for the court to
by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
instruct the jury on the definition of "proxiIn several Utah cases, the Utah Supreme
mate". Id. Despite the obvious improper Court has interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) and
conduct of the jury, such conduct must held that the rule authorizes a jury verdict
prejudice the substantial rights of defend- to be impeached by the affidavit of a juror
ant to warrant reversal. Id.; Utah only wheri the verdict was determined by
R.Civ.P. 61.
chance or bribery. Rosenlof v. Sullivan,
In State v. Donald, the Utah Supreme 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1983); Groen v.
Court held, in a forgery case, that a jury's TRI-O-INC, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah
164 (1974); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo.
392, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (1973); Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del.Super.
1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 726
(D.C.1976); Hampton v. State Highway
Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236, 24849 (1972); Sckmitzer v. Misener-Bennett
Ford, Inc., 135 Mich.App. 350, 354 N.W.2d
336, 340 (1984); Miller v. Haynes, 454
S.W.2d 293, 300 (Mo.Ct.App.1970); Selgado
v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M.
579, 544 P.2d 719, 722 (1975); Fields v.
Volkswagen, 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla.1976).
We agree with the rationale of those cases
and hold similarly that seat belt evidence is
inadmissible in this case which arose prior
to enactment of the present Utah statute.1

1. At the time this case was tried, the legislature
had not enacted Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186
(1987) which provides that "failure to wear a
seat belt does not constitute contributory or
comparative negligence, and may not be introduced as evidence in any civil litigation on the
issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of
damages."

2. How many jurors used the dictionary is unclear. For simplicity we will refer to one juror.
3. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted affidavits from different jurors regarding the use of
the dictionary.

Utah 305
1983); Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240,
408 P.2d 709, 710 (1965). The policy behind
the narrow interpretation of the law was
set forth in Wheat v. Denver & RG.W.R.
Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952):
To permit litigants to get jurors to sign
affidavits or testify to matters discussed
in connection with their functions as jurors would open the door to inquiry into
all manner of things which a losing litigant might consider improper: misconceptions of evidence or law, offers of
settlement, personal experiences, prejudice against litigants or their causes or
the classes to which they belong. It
would be an interminable and totally impracticable process. Such post mortems
would be productive of no end of mischief and render service as a juror unbearable. If jurors were so circumscribed in their deliberations, it is likely
that judge and counsel would have to be
present in the jury room attempting to
monitor and regulate their thought and
discussions into approved channels.
Id. 250 P.2d at 937.
Although the Utah Supreme Court lias
narrowly interpreted 59(a)(2) and limited
the circumstances under which jury affidavits may be admitted into evidence, the
Court also adopted the Utah Rules of Evidence on April 13, 1983 and made them
effective as of September 1, 1983. Under
Utah R.Evid. 606(b) "a juror may testify on
the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to
bear upon any juror." The Court's adoption of Rule 606(b) indicates an ititent to
allow juror affidavits into evidence under
the circumstances described in 606(b). In
effect, Rule 606(b) provides another exception to the general rule that juror affidavits
are inadmissible.
[6] Applying 606(b) to the facts of this
case, the dictionary was "extraneous information." Clearly, the judge did not give
the dictionary to the jury. Whether it was
"prejudicial" was dependent upon the definition examined by the jury. Because a
question existed as to whether or not use

of the dictionary was "prejudicial," both
affidavits were admissible under 606(b).
IV
[7] Finally, defendant argues that the
jury verdict was unreasonable and was
based on passion, prejudice and insufficient
evidence. Juries are given wide discretion
in assessing damages. Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1287
(1973). When a jury determines a question
of fact, its verdict will not be disturbed if it
is supported by any competent evidence.
Time Commercial Financing Corp. v.
Davis, 657 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah 1982); Uinta Pipeline Corp, v. White Superior Co.,
546 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1976); Nelson v.
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 1975).
Further, this Court will defer to the jury's
verdict unless it is "so excessive as to be
shocking to one's conscience and to clearly
indicate passion, prejudice or corruption."
McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co.,
62 Utah 115, 129, 218 P. 98, 104 (1923).
[8] The record indicates that the jury's
verdict is supported by competent evidence.
Further, the damages awarded are not
shockingly excessive in light of the extensive injuries suffered by plaintiff.
Affirmed.
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur.
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Utah Court of Appeals' Order Denying
Petition for Rehearing
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00000
Karen Hillier,
Plaintiff and Respondent/

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

v.
William J. Lamborn,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 860030-CA

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Defendant/
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter,
and the Court having duly considered said petition#
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing be denied.
Dated this 25th day of August, 1987.
FOR THE COURT:

Timothy M.
Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING by depositing the
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq.
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main, P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq.
Mark L. Anderson, Esq.
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 27th day of August, 1987.

\kn KM A
Karen Bean
Case^Management Clerk
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Utah Court of Appeals' Remittitur

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
October 9, 1987

Karen Hillier#
Plaintiff and Respondent,

REMITTITUR
No. 860030-CA
Case No. 34141

v.
William J. Lamborn,
Defendant and Appellant.

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered that the judgment of the trial court be and the same is
hereby affirmed.

Issued:

August 5, 1987

Record:

five volumes, six envelopes

Trial Court:

Second District, Davis County

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
PARTIES:
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq*
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Attorneys for Appellant
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main, P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq.
Mark L. Anderson, Esq.
Attorneys for Respondent
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
TRIAL COURT:
Davis County Clerk
Michael G. Allphin, Clerk
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, UT
84025
CERTIFICATION:
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of October, 1987, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was mailed to each
of the above parties by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid or by personally delivering the
same.

Karen Bean
Case Management Clerk

Exhibit "D"

Partial Transcript of proceedings on
April 17, 1987 (motion for new trial).

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

KAREN HILLIER,

)

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

REPORTER'S PARTIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

)

)

WILLIAM J. LAMBORN,

Civil No. 34141

Defendant.
II
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Tuesday, April 17, 1984,

12
13

the above-entitled matter came on for HEARING ON MOTIONS

14

in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis Count

15

State of Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY,

16

Presiding.
*

17

* * *

18 A P P E A R A N C E S :
19

For t h e

Plaintiff:

20
21
22
23
24

For the Defendant:

STEPHEN G. MORGAN
MARK L. ANDERSON
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
GARY B. FERGUSON
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN
Attorneys at Law
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

NANCY H. DAVIS
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Office: 451-3335

84110

1 I
2

THE COURT:

It was improper, of course, for the

bailiff to give the jury the dictionary, even though—and

3 J the Court recognizes that that is juror misconduct.

The

4 J Court had given a definition of proximate cause to the jury,
5

and my guess is, if they had read it carefully they would have

9

probably known what proximate meant.

7 I
3

I still have to ask myself the question whether
there was a reasonable possibility of prejudice on the part of

9 I the jurors by having that dictionary definition of proximate,
2o| and since they already had the definition of proximate cause
111 ^
12

the

Court, the Court does not believe it falls in that

category.

And so, it's not a basis for the Court granting a

131 new trial on that basis.
14

The Court allowed the unexpected danger instruction.

15 The jury must have believed it through the testimony of the
15 plaintiff as opposed to the testimony of the defendant as to
17| whose version of the facts were correct.

If they had done

18 that there is no way they could have arrived at the verdict
19 the way they did. It was a proper instruction*

That is not a

20 ground for a new trial.
21

The Court won't even comment on the seat belts.

221 That was ruled on at trial.
23

With regard to the renuttitur, the jury certainly

24 found damages that were within reason of the testimony that
25! was given.

Could have well found more than they did and still

X I been within reason.
2

So, there is no grounds for the Court to

grant a remittitur on that.

3I

As to the facts not supporting the verdict, there is

4.1 no question in the Court's mind that the facts do support the
5

verdict.

The jurors just chose to believe the testimony of

6 I the plaintiff as opposed to -whatever conflicting evidence may
7I have been supported by the experts.
&
9

And, of course, the Court did exactly the same thing
and so, I wouldn't be fojid to say that the jurors were

lOj unreasonable in

believing it or I would be saying I am un-

llj reasonable in believing it also.
12]

But, at any rate, your motion for a new trial is

131 denied and the remittitur is denied.
14

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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District court's minute entry
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5.

Amendments to Pleadings:

6.

Trial Briefs or Memorandum of Points and Authorities:

7. Trial:
8.

10.

,/

Jury

Jury Instructions supplied to Court
J
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Pre-trial Order prepared by
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12.
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Non Jury

9. Length of Trial:
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Inquire as to the possibility of settlement.
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District court's Pretrial Order framing issues for
trial
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STEPHEN G. iMORGAN
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KAREN HILLIER,
Plaintiff,

.

PRE-TRIAL ORDER

)

Civil No. 34141

vs.
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN,
Defendant.

The above matter came before the Court on November 14, 1983,
at a pre-trial conference held before the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby, District Judge, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Stephen G. Morgan appeared as attorney for Plain-

tiff and Robert G. Gilchrist appeared as attorney for Defendant.
It was there ordered that a Pre-Trial Order be filed and signed by
counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant on or before February 1,
1984.

The following represents that Pre-Trial Order.
1.

JURISDICTION.

This is an action to recover damages for

personal injuries of Plaintiff.

The jurisdiction of the Court is

not disputed and is hereby determined by the Court to be present.

2.

VENUE.

Since the accident occurred in Davis County,

State of Utah and both parties reside in Davis County, State of
Utah, venue is not disputed and is hereby determined by the Court
to be proper.
3.

GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES.
(a)

On November 13, 1982, on the frontage road

abou

1,000 feet North of Chase Lane near Centerville, Davis County, Uta
an accident occurred, which plaintiff claims was.caused by defenda
negligence in attempting to drive his vehicle in front of plaintif
vehicle when plaintiff's vehicle was so close she could nor avoid
a collision.

Plainriff also claims that as a direct and proximate

result of defendant's negligence that she sustained4 injuries and
damages.
(b)

Defendant's Claims.

Defendant claims that there

was no negligence on his part and defendant further claims that
plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence was the sole
proximate cause or a contributing proximate*cause of plaintifffs
injuries and damages, and further that such negligence was equal
to or greater than the negligence, if any, of defendant.

Defendant

further claims that plaintiff did not suffer the injuries and
damages to the extent alleged in her Complaint.
4.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS.

The following facts are establis

by admissions in the pleadings or by stipulation of counsel:
(a)

On Novemver 13, 1982, on the frontage road about

1,000 feet North of Chase Lane near Centerville, Davis County,
State of Utah, an accident occurred which involved a venicle driven
by plaintiff and a vehicle driven by defendant.
-2-

(b)

As of December 5, 1983, plaintiff had incurred

medical expenses of $51,345.90 plus an estimated additional medical
expense from Dr. Patton as of that date of $1,200.00, all as a result
of the injuries she received in the accident of November 13, 1982
and said expenses are reasonable for the services rendered; however,
defendant does not admit liability for said medical expenses.
5.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT.

The contested issues of

fact remaining for decision are:
(a)
negligence

a

Was defendant negligent?

If so, was such

proximate cause of the accident?
(b)

Was plaintiff negligent?

If so, was such negli-

gence a proximate cause of the accident?
(c)

If both defendant and plaintiff are negligent,

what percentage of fault is attributable to defendant and what
percentage of fault is attributable to plaintiff?
(d)

What amount of damages will fully compensate

plaintiff for the injuries and damages suffered as a result of the
accident?
6.

CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW.

There are no contested issues

of law other than those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact.
7.

EXHIBITS.

The following exhibits have been identified

by the parties:
(a)

Plaintiff's exhibits.
1.

List or summary of medical expenses;

2.

List or summary of other special damages

for loss of wages and earning capacity and future medical
expenses;

3.

Hospital records and records of treating

physicians, dentists, and other health care providers,
including photographs and x-rays;
4.

Hardware taken out of plaintiff and photos;

5»

Charts, photographs and other documents prepar

by investigating officers and accident reconstruction expert
(b)

Defendant's exhibits.
1.

Charts, photographs and other documents pre-

pared by investigating officers and accident reconstruction
experts;
2.
(c)

Photographs and x-rays of plaintiff.

Exhibits identified will be marked at 8:30 a.m.

on the date of trial, March 1, 1984, to the extent possible so as
to avoid any unnecessary delay during trial.
(d)

Except as otherwise indicated, the Exhibits

identified are subject to objections, if any, by the opposing party
at the trial as to their relevency and materiality.

If other

exhibits are to be offered and their necessity reasonably can be
anticipated, they will be submitted to opposing counsel at least on
day prior to trial.
8.

WITNESSES.
(a)

Plaintiff's witnesses.

In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counse
to the contrary, plaintiff may call.as witnesses the following
persons:

(1)

Karen Hillier; (2) Kevin Hillier; (3) Don Krambule;

(4) June Krambule; (5) Rich Krambule; (6) Dr. Lower; (7) Dr. Patton
(8) Dr. Jordan; (9) Dr. Lockharr; (10) Dr. DeDecker; (11) medical

Records Custodian of University Medical Center; (12) Medical
Records Custodian of Lakeview Hospital; (13) Trooper Brent Van Fleet;
(14) other investigating officers; (15) Frank Grant; (16) David
Stephens; (17) person knowledgable concerning where pheasant
hunting can legally be done; (18) person knowledgable concerning
Karen's employment and the effect which injuries have had on her
work; (19) William J. Lamborn as an adverse witness; and (20)
person knowledgeable concerning effect which injuries have had on
Karenfs life.
(b)

Defendant's witnesses.

In absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel
to the contrary. Defendant may call as witnesses the following
persons:

(1)

Trooper Brent Van Fleet; (2) Ron Wooley

(c)

In the event other witnesses are tc be called at

the trial, a statement of their names and addresses and the general
subject matter of their testimony will be served upon opposing
counsel and filed with the Court at least the Monday prior to the
Thursday trial date of March 1, 1984.

This restriction shall not

apply to rebuttal witnesses, the necessity of whose testimony canno.
reasonably be anticipated before trial.
9.

REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

a jury trial.

This matter is scheduled for

Requests for Instructions to the jury shall be

submitted to the Court on or before February 16, 1984.

Special

requests for voir dire examination of the jury shall be submitted
to Lhe Court by the afternoon prior to the commencement of trial.

Counsel may supplement requested instructions during trial on
matters nor reasonably anticipated prior to trial.
10.

AMENDMENTS TO PLEADING.

There were no requests to

amend pleadings.
11.

DISCOVERY.

Discovery is to be completed on or before

February 16, 1984.
12.

TRIAL SETTING.
f "

•

on March 1, 1984 at 9:30 a.m.
(3) days.

This case is set for trial with a jur

•

Estimated length of trial is three

Counsel shall be present at 8:30 a.m. on the date of

trial to mark exhibits and to meet with the Court to handle any
necessary matters prior to the commencement of trial at 9:00 a.m.
13.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT.

The possibility of settl

is considered to be fair.
DATED this ;

day of February, 19 84.
BY THE COURT:

Judge^

'

/

The foregoing proposed Pre-Trial Order is hereby adopted t
1st. day of February, 1984, prior to execution by the Court.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
NELSON

0

.

/
Q~+ \s

Stephen G. Morgan
T7
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

x/

\

<A

"*"s,v is

G^SBTT^i^tfsonf
Attorney \o£ Defe^/ant
CSB Tow^J 50 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84i:

Exhibit "G"

District court's Instruction 11 on proximate cause.

INSTRUCTION NO.

//

The proximate cause of an injury is-that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and withour
which the result would net have occurred.

It is the efficient

cause - the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury.

